CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

POLICY BRIEF

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CSIS Indonesia

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A Policy Brief by CSIS Indonesia

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Towards a Collaborative Approach to Addressing Influence Operations in Indonesia

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Introduction

The discourse surrounding the role of Influence Operations (IO) in elections has garnered increasing public attention. IO refers to organized efforts aimed at influencing the community or outcome (e.g., election) towards a specific goal.[4] It can also be defined as a strategic effort to manipulate public opinions or behaviors. Basically, it is a planned endeavor to shape how individuals perceive certain events.

To understand IO, three key elements must be considered. First, the primary objective is to achieve specific results, including influencing public opinion on particular issues or events, such as election outcomes. The tactics employed in IO also need to be considered. From a technological aspect, IO can utilize various tactics, including disseminating disinformation, leveraging social media to create fake accounts, and even hacking or launching cyberattacks. Beyond technology and social media tactics, IO can also occur in physical or real-world contexts, such as money politics during campaigns or acts of intimidation. IO also involves deceptive tactics to obscure its origins or intentions, making it challenging for individuals to assess the credibility of the information or events they encounter. The actors involved in IO vary from governments, activists, political parties, and business groups.

The emergence of terms such as "black" and "negative campaign" on social media platforms like Facebook, Instagram, TikTok and X (formerly Twitter) is evidence of IO's manifestations, especially during campaign periods. Efforts to curb and regulate these practices have involved stakeholders, including the Ministry of Communication and Informatics (Kominfo), the General Elections Commission (KPU), the General Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu), the National Cyber and Encryption Agency (BSSN), and the Cyber Crime Unit of the National Police Headquarters (Mabes Polri), by cooperating with social media platforms involved and compliance with Election, and Electronic Information and Transactions laws (UU Pemilu and UU ITE).

Looking at the trend of IO use through social media between the 2019 and 2024 elections, although it needs to be backed up by accurate data, there has been a decrease in terms of intensity and social impact, according to the informants in this study. The reasons include increasing digital literacy of the public, shorter campaign period in 2024 compared with 2019, the "emotional" nature

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[4] Kamya Yadav, et.al. What Makes an Influence Operation Malign? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Working Paper. August 2023.

of the 2019 Election stemming from the 2017 Regional Election – in contrast to the situation in the 2024 Election, and more young voters in the 2024 Election, who are perceived as more critical.

Differences in IO trends between 2019 and 2024 are also apparent. In 2019, IO on social media operated extensively due to intense competition involving an incumbent and only two candidates. In contrast, the 2024 Election features no incumbent and three new contenders, resulting in relatively balanced competition.

In spite of the declining intensity, it is a social fact that IO's spread through social media is becoming more progressive and massive. There is new creativity in utilizing technological developments for IO. For example, during the 2024 Election, there were many short videos. These videos often present challenges in verifying the authenticity or validity of the information contained. Despite rising digital literacy, these videos are sometimes consumed uncritically by the public, including easily persuaded younger generations. Consequently, some individuals may lose their voting rights due to misinterpretations of the information contained in such videos.

A deeper examination revealed that IO had been operating freely to influence voter preferences among specific societal segments during the 2024 Election. From a policy perspective, it remains difficult to distinguish or identify whether a video constitutes a negative or smear campaign, which complicates enforcement efforts.

Apart from social media, physical manifestations of IO have grown more pronounced in 2024 compared to 2019. This is because the president is seen as leaning towards or supporting one of the candidates. The president is not considered neutral, leading to increased physical IO practices. Money politics is a common practice of IO. Moreover, the increase in physical IO is characterized by many events such as distributing social assistance, hosting bazaars, or organizing sports competitions aimed at influencing individual preferences.

Other forms of IO include intimidation, affecting individuals ranging from the general public and regional head officials to campaign teams and election organizer apparatus. A case was reported where an election organizer experienced hacking. IO has been used to delegitimize election organizers. Co-optation of election organizers is a form of IO, such as political actors "intervening" from the beginning of the recruitment period or disobeying court rulings on a lawsuit. Such interference damages the operational mechanisms of election organizers. The removal of certain candidates' campaign banners is also a form of IO. During the 2024 Election, there appears to be a tendency for "apparatus to mobilize or be mobilized" down to the village level in support of specific candidates.

In general, research on IO faces at least two challenges. First, identifying IO activities is not straightforward, especially distinguishing between legal or positive IO and harmful or negative IO. For example, during the 2024 Election, there were several incidents during the campaign period that reflected IO, such as distributing social assistance and raising election organizers' salaries near polling day. These actions are normatively legal. However, they could be considered violations for systematically swaying public opinion toward certain candidates. In response to these complexities, Yadav et al., (2023) call for observation to the criteria of

transparency (who is behind the operation and what type of operation is conducted); quality of content (what is the quality of the content distributed); and action-related transparency (who is the target of the operation and what means are used).[5]

Beyond identification issues, the second challenge is the lack of clear regulations and legal frameworks for IO. In the context of elections, many controversial activities in both online and offline realms remain difficult to classify as legal violations. For example, Indonesia's General Election Commission Regulation (PKPU) 15/2023 on Election Campaigns defines the boundaries of campaigns narrowly as "calls to vote". As a result, many programs, activities, interactions, or operations that are deliberately designed to influence public opinion about particular candidates ultimately escape categorization as campaigns because they do not involve "calls to vote". This regulatory ambiguity that allows IO to operate may increase its influence.

Although IO is a global phenomenon, the situation or experience in each country is certainly different and unique, as evident in Indonesia through this study. Epistemologically, the term IO remains relatively unfamiliar to both the government and the general public, despite its widespread practice. Consequently, there is a praxis gap in IO policy contexts. IO is often also seen as something that is "given", overlooking the political-economics dynamics that underpin its practice in a country.

IO is frequently viewed only as a grassroots phenomenon involving candidates, campaign teams, and the public, neglecting its potential role as a politically orchestrated "grand design" involving multiple actors, including election organizers. IO thrives due to various underlying enabling factors, such as regulatory gaps and the existence of gray areas. Additionally, IO practices continue under the influence of the co-optation of various political actors and their diverse interests.

This report aims to provide a policy perspective on IO in Indonesia, involving the collaboration of relevant stakeholders. It was prepared following the 2024 Election and in anticipation of the Simultaneous Regional Elections campaigns scheduled for November. The limited time and preparations for the 2024 Regional Elections underscore the urgency of understanding IO trends and operations within Indonesia's electoral landscape.

This report incorporates the perspectives and challenges faced by stakeholders, including government bodies, political actors such as parties and politicians, mainstream media practitioners, technology companies, and election organizers. It is structured into two main sections. First, explaining why the IO trend occurs, followed by a discussion of sectoral challenges in addressing IO from a stakeholders' perspective. The second section offers recommendations, where we propose improvements specifically aimed at electoral participants, social media platforms, mainstream media, and the government.

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[5] Kamya Yadav, et.al. What Makes an Influence Operation Malign? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Working Paper. August 2023.

The Challenges of Eradicating Influence Operations

The characteristics of IO applications present four identified challenges. These challenges were observed during the 2024 Presidential Election and are crucial to understand in order to enable appropriate responses from all relevant actors ahead of the 2024 Regional Elections, whether election participants, organizers, or social media companies.

Covert Popular Operations

In-depth interviews with several election participants revealed that IO tactics were a popular choice, employed by all participants, including campaign teams and political parties. However, the covert and cautious execution of these operations made them difficult to expose during and after the elections. This is concerning because a new regulation can only intervene when the problematic object (in this case, IO practices) is identifiable, whether in terms of scale, the actors involved, or affiliations with election participants. The purpose is to establish rules that lead to better campaigns and eradicate the negative impacts of IO. This challenge mirrors trends in IO campaigns across other Southeast Asian regions, such as the Philippines[6].

As the 2024 Regional Elections approach, anticipating the application of IO becomes even more urgent because elections will take place simultaneously in hundreds of regions. This means that in each region where elections take place, there are hundreds of

different contexts, settings, and cultures. The covert nature of IO becomes even more challenging with the diversity of contexts incorporated into campaigns, demanding much better preparedness from all KPU and Bawaslu officials at the provincial, regency, and city levels.

Data Transparency from Platforms

Efforts to curb the influence of IO had been implemented extensively, including cross-sector collaborations among media activists, NGOs, the government, academics, and social media platform companies. A good example of this collaboration is CekFakta.com. Initiated by MAFINDO, AJI and AMSI in 2018, this fact-checking platform aimed to debunk IO-laden misinformation, using a network of online media and hundreds of fact-checkers across Indonesia.

However, the direct impact of such collaborations on reducing misinformation remains unclear, particularly in terms of their deterrent effect on the actors involved. For example, it is difficult to attribute the reduced intensity of misinformation during the 2024 election solely due to the successful multi-stakeholder advocacy efforts. This is partly due to external factors influencing the dynamics of misinformation and IO in Indonesia, such as the level of political polarization. Unlike previous elections, the 2024 Election was considered more conducive, as concerns over intense misinformation seen in the past two elections were not realized.

This does not imply that Indonesia will be free from the adverse effects of IO in the

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[6] Fatima Gaw, Jon Benedik A. Bunquin, Samuel I. Cabbuag, Jose Mari H. Lanuza, Noreen H. Sapalo, and Al-Habbyel B. Yusoph. "Political Economy of Covert Influence Operations in the 2022 Philippine Elections." *Internews* (2023). https://internews.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/InternewsPH_July2023_Political-Economy-of-Covert-Influence-Operations-in-the-2022-Philippine-Elections-2.pdf

future. The ever-dynamic political context requires continuous vigilance. Moreover, Indonesia is set to hold simultaneous regional elections later this year in 545 regions, including 37 provinces, 415 regencies, and 93 cities. So far, no consensus exists regarding the potential impact of social media on these elections. Additionally, there are no well-organized efforts from the government, platforms, or civil society to address potential misuse of social media in the context of regional elections that could harm the public.

Multi-stakeholder collaborations could be more effective if platforms provided support beyond mere funding. This has been challenging because most technology company representatives in Indonesia primarily focus on marketing division and communication liaison with the government. Meanwhile, technical divisions that manage

Gray Areas and Regulations

When examining the factors that support the proliferation of IO, the upstream aspect is the issue of rules and regulations, while the downstream aspect is the impact. These regulations cannot comprehensively govern every electoral activity in detail. Theoretically, no electoral activity is beyond regulation. However, there is always a void or "gray area". This gray area serves as a loophole exploited by IO actors due to the imperfections of the regulations. Numerous examples have shown how gray areas allow IO actors to operate freely.

A critical examination is needed to understand why such regulatory loopholes exist—not merely as a technical issue but as a political product. The creation of these regulations is often contaminated with political interests, with certain parties

how social media algorithms amplify messages are not yet available. This issue is significant, as the IO and misinformation problems in Indonesia are closely related to platform algorithms' inability to curb the spread of misinformation, hoaxes, hate speech, and similar content. Tailor-made issues are difficult to counter if approaches remain platform-centric rather than contextual, incorporating multi-stakeholder perspectives.

This highlights why some stakeholders frequently question the transparency of technology platforms. This problem stemmed from differing conceptions between platforms and domestic actors in each country regarding who should moderate controversial content and how it should be moderated. Addressing this requires lengthy deliberation and a middle ground that satisfies all parties.

unwilling to be disadvantaged by these laws. This is evident in two legal frameworks—Election Law (UU Pemilu) and Political Parties Law (UU Partai Politik)—which have undergone more judicial reviews than any other legislation.

From the technological dimension, an observer said that existing laws, such as the Election Law and the ITE Law, have not kept pace with technological developments. For instance, the Election Law only mentions social media as one of the campaign methods available to participants. However, technological developments, such as the shift from text or images to short videos, have created new impacts that the regulations did not anticipate.

Another example is the regulation in PKPU that requires the registration of 20 accounts for campaign participants. In practice,

numerous new, fake accounts and bots are becoming increasingly progressive. These regulations need to be updated to keep up with technological developments. Often, it is necessary to integrate various regulations to address IO comprehensively, rather than relying solely on the Election Law and ITE Law, for example, laws on national security governance.

On the physical aspect, regulations govern the type of aid that may be distributed, by whom, and under what conditions. Permitted distributions include campaign souvenirs like hats, calendars, prayer robes, and keychains featuring candidate and party attributes. Distributing other items with candidate attributes or narratives urging people to vote for particular specific candidates is prohibited. Only candidates and their registered campaign teams are allowed to distribute aid. Event organizers are also prohibited from using campaign attributes.

The reality on the ground is very different. Many violations occurred, including "smuggling" activities under the guise of social actions that are manifestations of IO. For instance, in disaster-affected regions, certain candidates have distributed rice to voters in their constituencies. While without overt campaign narratives, this is certainly an IO motive or to influence someone's choice.

Scheduled campaign activities are another gray area. If a candidate distributes aid before or after the official campaign period, it becomes difficult to classify as a violation. Similarly, hate speech, hoaxes, and slander on social media outside the campaign period are hard to address legally. There is also a rule stipulating that only registered candidates, campaign teams, and organizers may distribute aid.

In reality, individuals outside these groups often distribute aid independently. The community recognizes these individuals as sympathizers of particular candidates, yet the existing rules cannot address such actions. This practice constitutes an IO tactic, as election participants "intentionally" exclude these individuals from official campaign teams to give them freedom to distribute materials to voters.

During the quiet period, unregistered individuals or non-campaign team members often engaged in covert campaigning by distributing materials or other activities. Their actions were difficult to prosecute. Even if prosecuted, these individuals typically refused to disclose who directed them or owned the materials, claiming them as personal property.

Another example involves prohibited forms of aid, such as cash. Candidates circumvented this by using vouchers or e-money, which were also difficult to address. Societal mindsets could also be an issue. During campaign events, candidates invited voters to their homes for religious gatherings and provided transport money as a reward.

Such actions clearly violate regulations, but are difficult to enforce. A reward in the form of gasoline is not possible. Lower-income communities also expect material rewards for attending such events, creating a reciprocal relationship between candidates and communities. In other words, money politics goes both ways: candidates hand out the money and communities expect to get the money.

Furthermore, enforcement requires physical evidence, such as cash in envelopes. Confiscating such evidence was hampered by demands for compensation from

communities or money "confiscated" as evidence of this money politics. Election organizers were unprepared to anticipate such demands. Another obstacle to dealing with IO also came from individuals who refused to report being targeted by money politics. In such cases, KPU struggled to enforce its rules due to a lack of complainants, identified offenders, locations, or evidence.

In the 2024 Election, the phenomenon of bansos (social assistance), especially those involving President Joko Widodo gained significant momentum. The dissenting opinions of three Constitutional Court judges on the election lawsuit results highlighted the potential influence of social assistance on election outcomes. Anomalies were also observed in which the ministers responsible for social assistance were not involved in it, but instead involved ministers with unrelated duties, raising questions about why such social assistance came from the President's operational budget instead of the state budget (APBN). Social assistance was also distributed close to the election. The President's visits to key regions for social assistance distribution were also considered as indications of IO.

Comparing the Election Law and Regional Election Law reveals stricter rules in the latter. For instance, six months before candidate announcements, incumbents are prohibited from issuing policies that could benefit or disadvantage election participants. The Election Law lacks such provisions, leaving it "loose". As a result, actions such as the President raising the salaries of election organizers near the election period could not be legally challenged, even though they could be considered IO.

Conceptually, the term "pork barrel politics" becomes relevant if done by incumbents. Pork barrel politics is an attempt by incumbents to disburse or allocate a specific amount of funds for a specific purpose, which is to get re-elected. Although President Joko Widodo is not an incumbent and is not running for re-election, his actions to support certain candidates resemble pork barrel politics. While it is debatable whether these actions constitute IO, it is clear that there are no rules that can ensnare him.

Another gray area allows the President to campaign if he is a political party member. This rule assumes the president is incumbent and seeking re-election, but it does not apply to President Joko Widodo. While the regulations do not explicitly say that this is specifically for incumbents, it leaves room for manipulation and makes it part of IO. The above discussion illustrates how IO exploits loopholes and gray areas to operate beyond the reach of regulations.

Technical Problems in Organizing Election

Among the seven modes of operation described in the "Political Actors and Infiltration of Interests" section of the SAIL Snapshot, IO often benefits from technical weaknesses within the KPU and Bawaslu. For example, there was a delay in issuing regulations in the case of KPU. Election stages commenced 20 months before voting day, but only the regulations on budget preparation were released, participant verification, and PKPU concerning vote counting were released on December 18, 2023 instead. Meanwhile, voting day was scheduled for February 14, 2024. Similarly, the PKPU on vote recapitulation was released on February 12, 2024, or just two days before the election.

The delayed issuance of PKPU leaves insufficient time to socialize the regulations, leading to public misunderstandings that can easily be exploited by IO. These delays stem from KPU's inability to manage tasks and schedules effectively.

Another example was the recruitment of KPU members at the central and regional levels. The process was carried out simultaneously with the election stages, heightening potential conflicts of interest.

The problems related to the vote recapitulation information system (Sirekap) were also widely criticized by the public due to the lack of transparency in data processing and election results. This contrasts starkly with previous elections that relied on advanced systems for data collection like Silog (Logistics Information System), Silon (Candidate Information System), and Situng (Vote Counting Information System). The disorganized state of Sirekap had led the public to question whether this was merely a technical issue or an intentional act of IO.

Other technical issues involve the human resources of election organizers, both in terms of quantity and quality. In terms of quantity, more human resources are needed to handle IO. The KPU and Bawaslu lack sufficient resources to handle public complaints and violations effectively. In terms of quality, capacity building is needed to enable them to understand the nuances of IO and to be supported by adequate technological infrastructure.

Recommendations

For Election Participants

- Political parties should provide political education to their constituents about the development of IO as a digital campaign strategy. This initiative could serve as a **unique selling proposition** for political parties in the midst of a wild digital campaign ecosystem.

- Political parties must advocate for the House of Representatives (DPR) and the KPU to improve regulations on digital campaigns for both executive (national and regional) and legislative (national and regional) elections. The aim is **to establish a level playing field in online campaigns**, ensuring small political parties have a fair opportunity to gain exposure in the digital realm, even when competing with resource-rich parties. This is particularly relevant during regional elections, as national-level parties with strong financial and social instruments may not always have similar advantages in the hundreds of regions holding elections in November.

For Election Organizers

- Ensure that the selection or recruitment process for KPU and Bawaslu members is conducted professionally and remains free from the influence of any parties, including political parties and members of DPR. An independent institution should be established to guarantee a professional selection process,

aiming to produce KPU and Bawaslu members with integrity.

- Enhance the capacity of human resources within the Honorary Council of the General Election Organizer (DKPP), KPU, and Bawaslu, particularly at the regional level, to better understand IO and methods to address it, alongside strengthening knowledge of election-related matters. Furthermore, the capacity and understanding of lower-level election organizers, such as the Subdistrict Election Committee (PPK), Voting Committee (PPS), and Voting Organizer Group (KPPS), regarding regulations, digitalization, and IO monitoring practices, must also be improved.

- The KPU must ensure that all PKPU regulations are completed before the election stages begin, allowing sufficient time for effective public socialization and understanding.

- Intensify interactions among election organizing institutions to foster mutual understanding and avoid differing interpretations when handling cases. Such interactions should also extend to judicial institutions like the Constitutional Court (MK), Supreme Court (MA), and Administrative Court (PTUN).

- Election organizing institutions should ensure that political education funds allocated to political parties are used appropriately to minimize IO practices.

- For Bawaslu specifically, in addition to ensuring integrity, the availability of human resources with expertise in election law is crucial, given its authority to address violations, including those related to IO. These resources must have experience in handling legal cases, both litigation and non-litigation, possess strong analytical and decision-making skills, and be able to work professionally under tight time constraints. Election cases often involve strict deadlines, requiring prompt and accurate responses.

- Bawaslu, as an election supervisory agency, should leverage Artificial Intelligence (AI) to combat IO during elections by collaborating with stakeholders such as the Ministry of Communication and Informatics (Kominfo), BSSN, cyber police, social media platforms, AI communities, and tech startups. AI can be utilized to detect disinformation, identify bots or fake accounts, trace IO networks, monitor public conversations, and educate the public. However, the use of AI must be transparent, accountable, and mindful of data protection and freedom of expression, involving KPU, DKPP, DPR, and research institutions to ensure checks and balances.

For Social Media Platforms

- The presence of social media platform representatives facilitates communication and coordination among stakeholders. **This coordination has evolved into institutional collaboration** between tech companies, the government, and civil society. **Such**

collaboration must deepen in the future. Financial support enabling civil society initiatives to counter IO, as seen in recent years, should continue and expand, including greater participation from communities outside Jakarta.

- Given the limited resources of tech companies to expand their reach, **an effective collaboration model involving cross-organizational or regional cooperation should be developed** to maximize the impact of tech companies' funding.

- Another essential consideration is **granting open access to data and information for research and public policy purposes**. Tech companies hold vast data resources, yet much of this data remains restricted for commercial use, while academic and policy-oriented utilization is significantly limited. Since technical expertise is required to use this data effectively, **guidance and training on social media data utilization** should be facilitated by the platforms.

- Open access must certainly consider the security and sensitivity of the data. However, **the criteria and requirements for granting access, or which data may and may not be used for non-commercial purposes, remain unclear to the public**. The open access could shape perceptions of social media platforms' transparency in conducting business. Not only the platforms, but the public, policy makers, and the research

communities will benefit from this access.

- Finally, **the establishment of technical division representatives within each social media platform in Indonesia should be considered to address the contextual challenges of IO**. Currently, most representative offices focus on marketing and policy divisions, without divisions specializing in social media algorithms, AI operations, or data provision. Opening these technical divisions is expected to reduce the negative implications of IO through platform-based approaches, combined with civil society-based strategies that have been implemented to date.

For Mainstream Media

- The influence of internet and social media developments on mainstream media business models has created significant challenges. **Mainstream media need to adapt both in terms of business models, organizational structures, and human resources in the context of increasingly powerful new media**.

- Misinformation remains one of the many challenges for mainstream media. While it is difficult to identify media practitioners involved in IO groups that misuse social media, **regular training and workshops for media practitioners—focusing on misinformation, its mechanisms, and its adverse impacts—should become an integral part of journalistic training.**

- However, the internalization of journalistic values and ethical codes remains uneven among journalists. **Every socialization of journalistic ethical codes, whether conducted internally by media organizations or professional associations, should be integrated into the context of current social media and AI developments and how these advancements influence journalists' adherence to professional ethics.**

- **The influence of tech platforms could potentially lead mainstream media to view social media companies as competitors and "threats" rather than partners.** This can lead to unhealthy competition, where each party can impose its own view on an issue. Therefore**, sustained cross-profession collaboration between media practitioners and social media platforms must be pursued sustainably to establish a positive and mutually trusting relationship. This includes cooperation in addressing sensitive issues, such as discussions on the substance of Presidential Regulation (Perpres) Number 32/2024 on Quality Journalism.**

For the Government

Considering the complexity of IO movements in the context of elections, as discussed above, integrated and systematic interventions are required:

- There must be an evaluation and revision of the Election Law, Regional Election Law, and ITE Law to narrow the gray areas that IO can exploit, including accommodating IO developments in cyberspace. This revision should include a deterrent effect that must be felt by offenders.

- Efforts should be made to synergize various regulations, both laws and regulations beyond the Election Law, Regional Election Law, and ITE Law, related to the scope of IO in order to deal with them effectively.

- The formulation of Election and Political Party Laws in the DPR should be overseen by an independent and autonomous legislative body. This oversight is necessary to minimize the influence of political interests during the regulatory drafting process.

- The distinction between freedom of speech and hate speech in social media campaign regulations should be clarified.

Conclusion

The issue of IO is inseparable from the advancements in technology, social media, and political interests. Numerous studies have highlighted the election momentum as a critical context for examining the influence of IO on society. The fact that Indonesia, one of the world's largest democracies with significant social media users, faces a tangible challenge in preventing or mitigating the negative excesses of IO in the future. While initial findings suggest that the 2024 Election is relatively more conducive than the

2019 Election, this does not imply that IO issues will simply disappear. The political context that creates a supply-demand relationship plays a significant role in IO dynamics, including how IO actors collaborate with stakeholders such as politicians and public officials.

The issue of IO is not only unique to Indonesia. Many studies have shown how IO operates in other parts of the world, including developed countries in Europe and America. To date, no universal approach has been agreed upon to address the impact of IO. Consequently, there are no guidelines to assist in the formulation of policy. This report underscores the urgency of policy reform given the limited prevention efforts, numerous gray areas, and regulatory ambiguities related to elections, campaign violations, social assistance in elections, and public opinion manipulation. Indonesia needs to formulate its own approach, ensuring that the chosen strategy considers the interests and perspectives of multiple stakeholders to maximize its benefits.