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National Public Opinion Survey Mis/Disinformation Map in Indonesia: Belief Levels and Their Impact on Democracy

Arya Fernandes, Beltsazar Krisetya, Ega Kurnia Yazid
CSIS/Safer Internet Lab



@saferinetlab



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Background

- This public opinion survey was conducted to capture **the spread of information disorder** in Indonesia following the 2024 Election and **analyze its impact on democratic values and elections**.
- Given a competitive electoral landscape, increased public access to the internet and social media, and societal changes, [a post-election survey is crucial](#) to evaluate the current map of information disorder and public vulnerability.
- In this survey, we use the term **"information disorder"** to describe **misinformation** (inaccurate or false information disseminated without the intention to mislead) and **disinformation** (false or inaccurate information deliberately created and disseminated [with the objective to deceive or manipulate](#)).



Aspects measured in this survey?

This survey measured several issues related to information disorder, including:

- What are [the levels of public belief](#) in information disorder before and after the election?
- What factors [influence a person's](#) belief in information disorder?
- To what extent does belief in information disorder [affect satisfaction with and support for democracy](#), as well as [trust in election integrity](#)?
- Is there a correlation between belief in information disorder and [public attitudes towards the role of the state](#)?
- How high or low is [the use of Generative AI](#) in presidential election campaign?



Methodology

Population	The survey population consisted of Indonesian residents across 34 provinces in Indonesia. The target population was Indonesians aged 17 years and older or married at the time of the survey.
Sampling	Samples were drawn fully randomized using the multistage random sampling method, taking into account the proportion of the sample size to the population in each province, the proportion of females and males, and the categories of urban and rural areas.
Sample Size and Margin of Error (MoE)	The sample size of 1,200 respondents was proportionally distributed across 34 provinces. Using 1,200 samples, the survey's margin of error was calculated to be +/- 2.8% , with a confidence level of 95% .
Interviews	Face-to-face interviews were conducted using questionnaires by enumerators.
Quality Control	Quality control was implemented at various stages, starting with the recruitment process, enumerator training, supervision of data collection, field spot checks, and validation and verification after data collection (call-back).
Survey Period	October 31 - November 7, 2024
Professional Membership	Association of Indonesian Public Opinion Surveyors (PERSEPI)



Sample and Population Validation: Province

Code	Name of Province	Population (2020 BPS Census)	Sample (2024)
1	ACEH	2,0	1,7
2	NORTH SUMATRA	5,5	5,4
3	WEST SUMATRA	2,0	2,1
4	RIAUI	2,4	2,5
5	JAMBI	1,3	1,3
6	SOUTH SUMATRA	3,1	3,3
7	BENGKULU	0,7	0,8
8	LAMPUNG	3,3	3,3
9	BANGKA BELITUNG ISLANDS	0,5	0,8
10	RIAUI ISLANDS	0,8	0,8
11	SPECIAL CAPITAL REGION OF JAKARTA	3,9	4,2
12	WEST JAVA	17,9	17,9
13	CENTRAL JAVA	13,5	13,3
14	SPECIAL REGION OF YOGYAKARTA	1,4	1,7
15	EAST JAVA	15,1	15,0
16	BANTEN	4,4	4,2
17	BALI	1,6	1,7

Code	Name of Province	Population (2020 BPS Census)	Sample (2024)
18	WEST NUSA TENGGARA	2,0	1,7
19	EAST NUSA TENGGARA	2,0	1,7
20	WEST KALIMANTAN	2,0	2,1
21	CENTRAL KALIMANTAN	1,0	0,8
22	SOUTH KALIMANTAN	1,5	1,7
23	EAST KALIMANTAN	1,4	1,3
24	NORTH KALIMANTAN	0,3	0,4
25	NORTH SULAWESI	1,0	0,8
26	CENTRAL SULAWESI	1,1	0,8
27	SOUTH SULAWESI	3,4	3,3
28	SOUTHEAST SULAWESI	1,0	0,8
29	GORONTALO	0,4	0,4
30	WEST SULAWESI	0,5	0,8
31	MALUKU	0,7	0,8
32	NORTH MALUKU	0,5	0,4
33	WEST PAPUA	0,4	0,4
34	PAPUA	1,6	1,7



Sample and Population Validation: Gender, Domicile, dan Regional Characteristic

Category	Population (2020 BPS Census)	Sample (2024)
Gender		
Male	50,58	50,0
Female	49,42	50,0
Domicile		
Java	56,1	56,3
Outside Java	43,9	43,8
Regional Characteristic		
Urban	56,7	56,3
Rural	43,3	43,8



Respondent Profiles: Religion, Ethnicity, Education Level, and Expenditure

Religion	Sample
Islam	91,8
Christian/Protestant	5,1
Catholic	1,9
Hindu	0,8
Buddhist	0,3
Confucianism	0,1
Ethnic Groups	Sample
Javanese	41,3
Sundanese	14,8
Malay	5,0
Betawi	4,2
Batak	3,5
Minangkabau	3,1
Madurese	3,0
Dayak	2,5
Buginese	2,3
Makassarese	2,1

Ethnic Groups (continued)	Sample
Banjar	1,4
Papuan	1,4
Acehnese	1,2
Balinese	1,1
Sasak	1,1
Ambonese	0,8
Chinese Indonesian	0,8
Timorese	0,7
Others	9,9

Highest Education Level	
Elementary (SD/SLTP/Equivalent)	58,3
Secondary (SLTA/Equivalent)	32,8
Higher (Academy/Undergraduate)	9,0
Average Family Expenditure/Monthly	
Below Rp 1.000.000	13,5
Rp 1.000.000 to Rp 2.000.000	31,0
Rp 2.000.001 to Rp 3.000.000	26,2
Rp 3.000.001 to Rp 4.000.000	16,4
Rp 4.000.001 to Rp 5.000.000	5,8
Above Rp 5.000.000	6,9
N/A	0,2



Presentation structure

1. Mapping and measuring information disorder
2. Factors influencing susceptibility to information disorder and its impact on democracy and perceptions of election integrity
3. The use of generative AI and deepfake videos in the 2024 election
4. A portrait of internet accessibility



Part One

Mapping and Measuring Information disorder



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Measuring Belief in Information disorder

In this survey, we read several pieces of information that had been verified as false information.

The respondents were asked to answer whether they **believed or did not believe the content or the substance of the false information.**



Public belief in information disorder (Survey after the 2024 Election)*

Election-related false information

1. **KPU Servers** are located in China.
2. **SIREKAP** election results were manipulated to resemble quick count results.
3. DKPP **annulled Prabowo-Gibran's victory** because the age requirement was not fulfilled.
4. **Overseas election results** were announced by the KPU before the February 14, 2024 election.
5. KPU added **52 million voters** to favor certain presidential/vice presidential candidates.
6. **Gibran Rakabuming Raka's diploma** is only equivalent to a vocational high school (SMK).
7. President Joko Widodo **distributes free basic food packages** in front of the Palace in connection with the 2024 Election.
8. **The 2024 Election results were predetermined by the KPU** before the election was held.


Non-Election false information

1. President Joko Widodo is of Chinese descent.
2. Covid-19 vaccine is implanted with a chip or **tracking device** that can monitor the movements of the vaccinated individual.
3. Covid-19 is a **manufactured weapon** of mass killing.
4. Covid-19 vaccination can cause disabilities in children.
5. The Minister of Religious Affairs once replaced the **Halal logo**, which used Arabic script, with a Wayang (shadow puppet) image.
6. The enactment of the **Law** on Sexual Violence Crimes aims to legalize free sex.
7. Efforts are currently underway to revive the **PKI** (Indonesian Communist Party).
8. The earth is actually **flat**, not round as taught in schools.

The false information tested in this survey had been verified as false or fake news by the CekFakta coalition and Kominfo. The selection of false information was based on its frequency of distribution during the election. Meanwhile, non-election false information was selected based on its recurring pattern of distribution or a clear trend.



Levels of public belief in information disorder*



Public belief in **election-related information disorder increased sharply** compared to belief in non-election information disorder.

Why does this happen?


Reason 1:

The volume of information disorder increases during election periods. Despite increased fact-checking efforts, these efforts still struggle to keep up with the speed at which mis/disinformation spreads.

*Levels of belief were measured based on responses to [one or more](#) of the information disorder items surveyed. Eight aspects were examined for both election-related and non-election information disorder.



Why does public belief in information disorder increase? (Reason 2 - stagnant public information resilience)




While the circulation of information disorder increased, the public's resilience in **verifying false information** did not improve (**remained stagnant**)



Why does public belief in information disorder increase?

(Reason 3 - low public participation in reporting mis/disinformation)



The spread of hoaxes increased, but the public's resilience to participate in reporting fake news via **social media reporting channels** remained very low.



Key findings and analysis (1)

- The levels of public belief in information disorder **increased in the post-election survey (November 2024)**, compared to the pre-election survey (September 2023).
- Although belief in information disorder increased, **the impact was not as significant as during the 2019 Election**. This limited impact is reflected in the absence of societal polarization, a decline in hate speech during the election, minimal use of identity politics, and the acceptance of the election result by the losing candidate.
- The low impact of information disorder may also be attributed to: the **consensus among elites** to run responsible campaigns, the increased **involvement of technology platforms** in addressing information disorder, and the role of fact-checking media/organizations.



Part Two

Factors influencing belief in information disorder and its impact on democracy and perceptions of election integrity




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
Factors influencing belief in information disorder



- **Urban** Characteristic, **Average Expenditure**, and **Frequency of Political Discussions** are significantly **positively** associated with belief in mis/disinformation.
- **Age** Characteristic and **Political Literacy** are significantly **negatively** associated with belief in mis/disinformation
- Living in **Urban Area**, and **high frequency of political discussion** have the **highest coefficients** of association with belief in disinformation



The impact of belief in information disorder on democracy and electoral integrity



Insights:


1. The spread of information disorder can **reduce individual satisfaction with and support** for democracy and affect trust in election results.
2. The variable of **political literacy influences** individual support for democracy and increases trust in election results.

Respondents who **belief** in mis/disinformation tend to:

- a. **Dissatisfied** with democracy
- b. **Do not support** the democratic system
- c. Believe that the 2024 Election **was not fair and honest**



The relationship between belief in information disorder and public attitudes toward the role of the state



There is no significant relationship between belief in information disorder and the role of the state in managing information.



Key findings and analysis (2)

- Satisfaction with and support for democracy are influenced by the extent to which **information disorder spreads** at high or low levels. High levels of information disorder can **reduce individual satisfaction with and support for** democracy.
- **Political/information literacy** can **affect** levels of individual satisfaction and trust in election results.



Part Three

The Use of Generative AI and Deepfake* in the 2024 Election



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*In this survey, respondents were asked about their experiences and opinions regarding campaign materials created using artificial intelligence (AI) technology. During the survey, the interviewers showed them images and videos generated by generative AI and asked for their opinions/responses. Deepfake refers to the manipulation of videos using generative AI technology.



Examples of generative AI and deepfake video used in campaigns



Pictures created using artificial intelligence (AI) technology

The pictures were used by the elected president and vice president during the [2024 Presidential Election campaign](#). Prabowo won [58% of the votes](#).



Example of video content created using artificial intelligence (AI) technology

A video of former President Soeharto urging the public to vote for the Golkar Party.




Example of video content (deepfake)

A video showing Anies Baswedan speaking Arabic, even though he does not speak the language. This video is an example of [false information created through digital manipulation](#).



Public Exposure to the Use of Generative AI in Campaigns (%)



71,5% of respondents had seen **Prabowo-Gibran pictures** created using AI.


The spread of **deepfake video (Anies speaking in Arabic video)**, was also quite significant, with **22,4% of respondents** had seen the video.

Meanwhile, **11,8% of respondents** had seen the **Soeharto advertisement** promoting the Golkar Party during the 2024 Election.



Sharing AI-generated content

(Only asked to respondents who had seen such content)



22,4% of respondents who had seen **Prabowo-Gibran pictures** admitted to sharing them with others.

4,1% of respondents who had seen the video of **Anies speaking in Arabic** admitted to sharing it.

Meanwhile, **4,3% of respondents** who had seen the **Soeharto advertisement** admitted to sharing it.



Belief in AI-generated content

Example of President Soeharto Advertisement

Description	Baseline	True	Not true	Don't know	Total
Video Advertisement of Soeharto					
Had seen	11,8	33,3%	42,6%	24,1%	100,0%
Hadn't seen	88,3	19,2%	55,4%	25,4%	100,0%

Q: Do you think that the statement in the video was actually made by President Soeharto?

The public's vulnerability in distinguishing between authentic and fabricated content is high.

A **third** of the respondents who had seen President Soeharto advertisement in the 2024 Election **believed that the statement was made by President Soeharto**, despite the fact that he had already passed away.

A **quarter** of the respondents also **stated that they did not know** whether the statement was actually made by President Soeharto.



Key findings and analysis (3)

- The use of artificial intelligence (AI) technology is **predicted to be increasingly** used.
- While the Constitutional Court (MK) has prohibited the use of AI in campaigns, the rapid technological development makes the regulation **difficult** to enforce.
- The public still **struggles to distinguish** between information conveyed directly and information generated using artificial intelligence.
- A concerning aspect is **the use of deepfake videos in campaigns**, which can mimic voices and resemble individuals in images/photos/videos.



Part Four

Portrait of Internet Accessibility in Indonesia



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


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
Internet Usage (%)

Have you ever **accessed the internet** (e.g. browsing social media or searching for news on the internet) via a smartphone or computer/laptop in **the last 1 (one) week?**



The proportion of people accessing the internet **increased** from **41.7%** (2019) to **64.5%** (2023) and **72.8%** (2024).

The number of internet users based on the total population in Indonesia (in millions)




Around 205 million Indonesians, or 72.8%, accessed the internet in 2024.



Most frequently used social media in the past week (%)


(asked only of respondents who accessed the internet)



Public access to **TikTok** increased the most compared to other social media platforms, while **WhatsApp** remains **the most frequently used** platform.




Internet Usage by Area (%)



Internet usage rates have **increased** across all regions in Indonesia. **Central Java and Yogyakarta (DIY)** have experienced the **most significant growth** from 2023 to 2024.




Internet Usage by Regional Characteristics (%)



The levels of internet usage **increased** in both rural and urban areas, with **significantly higher** usage in **urban areas**.




Internet usage by age group (%)



The levels of internet usage **increased** in both the 17-39 years and 40 years and above age groups, with **higher** usage among those **under 40 years of age**.




Internet usage by island (%)



The levels of internet usage **increased** in both Java and outside Java. While usage **remains higher** in **Java**, the gap between Java and other regions is **not significantly large**.




Main source of information (%)



Television is no longer the main source of information, **declining significantly** from 75% (2019) to 39.3% (2023) and **28.8% (2024)**. On the other hand, **social media** is **increasingly** becoming the main source of information, with **56.5%** of respondents using it to find information in 2024.



Medium for political information (%)



Despite its decline, **television** remains the **primary medium** for acquiring political information.



Key findings and analysis (4)

- Public access to the internet has **increased significantly** year-on-year. At the same time, **a high proportion** of people access messaging apps, video platforms, and social media applications.
- The digital divide **between regions** and **by island** (Java vs outside Java) **is narrowing** compared to the previous year. However, **significant gaps remain** in terms of **age** (younger vs older) and **regional characteristics** (rural vs urban).
- While **television** is still **a major source** of political information, its role as the main source of information has **declined sharply**. **Social media** is now the main source of information for the public.



Concluding Notes and Recommendations

- A multi-stakeholder collaboration for implementing **prebunking and debunking** processes on election-related issues among election organizers (KPU/Bawaslu/DKPP), election participants, the public, and civil society **requires significant attention** and should be **continued beyond the election period**.
- In the context of elections, ensuring an **election with integrity** (a vote counting system accessible to the public, professionalism of organizers, and voter data protection) is crucial **to minimize the spread of false information** about elections.





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